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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
INsU ANCE-EFFEcT OF STANDARD FIRE PoLicY CLAUSE lRonm-
rrlNG ADDITIONAL INSURANCE ON INSURERS' LiABfr.-Insured pro-
cured two standard form fire insurance policies on his residence,
each with a clause prohibiting additional insurance without permis-
sion of the insurer. The policies provided that the insurer would
not be liable for any loss which occurred while a condition of the
policy was being violated. Insured sought recovery from the first
insurer, who resisted on the ground that procurement of the second
policy voided its liability on the first. Held, insured could recover
under the terms of the first policy. The concurrent warranty of the
second policy was violated at its inception by the existence of the
original policy and as a consequence no insurance actually came
into being to breach the original policy. Kelley v. American Ins.
Co., 316 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
West Virginia has adopted the 1943 Standard New York Fire
Insurance Policy, which contains provisions substantially the same
as those in the policies of the principal case. W. VA. CODE ch. 33,
art. 17, § 2 (Michie Supp. 1957). The provisions have been held
valid because the moral hazard of over-insurance should not be
increased by the insured without the knowledge of this additional
risk by the insurer. Heldreth v. Federal Land Bank, 111 W. Va. 602,
163 S.E. 50 (1932).
As to the liability of the first insurer, it is the law in West Vir-
ginia that where such a provision is included in the policy, procure-
ment of additional insurance voids this policy, and the insurer is
not liable on his contract. Cook v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ass'n, 139
W. Va. 700, 81 S.E.2d 71 (1954); Oates v. Continental Ins. Co.,
137 W. Va. 501, 72 S.E.2d 886 (1952).
MuIn'AY LAw-JumSDICTION OF MrrYaY TBmuNAL-CON-
SmucTIoN OF TERm "IN Tnvm OF PEAcE."-Petitioner, serving a sen-
tence in the custody of the Army within the borders of the United
States, was convicted by a court-martial of conspiracy to commit
the crime of murder. The offense was committed on June 10, 1949.
Article of War 92, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch. II, § 1,
41 Stat. 805, in effect at the time, provided that no person shall be
tried by court-martial for murder committed in the United States
"in time ol peace." World War II was not officially terminated by a
formal declaration of peace and a Presidential Proclamation until
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April 28, 1952. Petitioner sought habeas corpus to set aside his
conviction on the ground that the crime was committed "in time
of peace." Held, the court-martial was without jurisdiction as the
crime was committed in time of peace. Statutory language will be
construed to conform to the traditional guarantees protecting the
rights of citizens, and thus Article of War 92, supra, will be read
generously to the end that officers and soldiers shall be protected
by having secured to them a trial by their peers. Lee v. Madigan,
79 Sup. Ct. 276 (1959).
A forceful dissent points to the case of Kahn v. Anderson, 255
U.S. 1 (1920), which held that the term "in time of peace" con-
templated complete peace, and this state of peace did not come to
pass with the cessation of active hostilities. The dissent also points
to Ludecke v. Watkins, 885 U.S. 160 (1948), for the proposition
that a state of war continues until terminated by the political branch
of the government. The majority opinion, however, brushes aside
the language of the Kahn case, supra, as dictum and the language
of the Ludecke case, supra, as generalized statements not disposi-
tive of the immediate controversy and quotes approvingly from
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955), to the
effect that the "free countries of the world have tried to restrict
military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely
essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service."
For a general discussion of what constitutes "time of peace' and
"time of war", see 56 Am. JuR. War § 18 (1947).
MONOPOLmS-DETRMRVATON OF REsTEAiNT OF TAADE- -- o-
MOTION OF CHAAIoNsIP BOXING CoNrsr CONSTrUTES A BELE-
vT MAxEr.-D gained exclusive control in 1949 of the promo-
tion of championship boxing matches in three divisions, and required
each title contender to grant to it an exclusive promotion contract
for his championship fights for a period of from three to five years.
D also controlled, exclusively throughout the nation, the key facili-
ties for staging the contests, and during a four year period promoted
and staged approximately 81% of the championship fights in this
country. Held, that D, by virtue of this exclusive control, possessed
power of monopoly and restraint of trade in respect to the relevant
market in the promotion of championship fights as distinguished
from the promotion of all boxing contests, and is subject to the
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strong and far-reaching decrees which may be molded pursuant to
the Sherman Antitrust Act. International Boxing Club v. United
States, 79 Sup. Ct. 245 (1959).
When this antitrust action was originally instituted by the
government, the district court dismissed the complaint on the au-
thority of Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200
(1922), followed in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953), -which had held that the business of giving baseball exhibi-
tions was not within antitrust laws. The Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the district court on the theory that Congress had
taken no action on the decision in the Federal Baseball case, supra,
and thus had not brought baseball under antitrust legislation, while,
as to bodng, there was no such obstacle to prevent application of
antitrust laws. See United States v. International Boxing Club of
N.Y., 343 U.S. 236 (1955). For a further discussion of antitrust
laws as applied to professional sports, see Pierce, Organized Pro-
fessional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 43 Coiu u. L.Q.
566 (1958); Keith, Developments in the Application of Antitrust
Laws to Professional Team Sports, 10 HAsTiNcs L.J. 119 (1958).
MuNmcan'A CoRPoRnoNs-PoucE PnoTEm oN-Mumcn'Anrrv
LIALE iOR NEciaGENCE iN FALuRE TO ADEQUATELY P 1oTEcr IN-
FoRMEw .--F, as administrator, brought a wrongful death action
against the City of New York for the death of P's intestate. The
complaint alleged that decedent had given information leading to
the arrest of a dangerous fugitive from justice, that his part in the
fugitive's capture had been highly publicized, and that decedent
thereafter had received threats on his life of which he notified the
police. He alleged that the city did not use reasonable care, in that
it failed to supply police protection, which had been demanded;
it imparted in decedent a false impression of safety and lack of
danger, and, as a direct result of this lack of reasonable care,
decedent was shot and killed by persons unknown. Held, that this
complaint stated a good cause of action. The city breached its
common law obligation by terminating its protection. of decedent,
when, in the exercise of reasonable care, it was apparent that ac-
ceptance of the information furnished by decedent,. together with
the publicity of his role, enlarged the risk of bodily harm to him,
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since a reciprocal duty arises on the part of society to use reason-
able care for the police protection of persons who have aided
in the apprehension of enemies of society. Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
This 4-3 decision is a reversal of the earlier case of Schuster v.
City of New York, 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.2c1 778 (1955),
which held that there was no duty on the City of New York to
protect P's intestate and that, if a duty existed, P had failed to show
in his complaint that the violation was the proximate cause of
decedents death. For a criticism of this earlier decision, and a
compilation of cases which discuss the governmental duty to pro-
tect its citizens, see Comment, 58 W. VA. L. BEy. 305 (1958). See
also 18 McQunmL, MuNICiPAL CouoRtATioxs, § § 53, 51 (3d ed.
1950), for a discussion of tort liability of municipal police forces.
M. D. W., Jr.
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